The objectives are big
China has sent a complement of 50 troops 19 km into Indian territory in the DBO sector in the middle of the strategically-significant Depsang Bulge. The sector is at an altitude of 17,000 feet. Protracted discussions have just begun. China claims the territory as its own; India is busy finding ways to secure a retreat of Chinese troops. The development reflects poorly on Indi's so-called China experts.
China has been frantically developing its national power with economic acitivity, expansive military infrastructure and technology build-up. On the contrary, India has been a meek reactionary hobbled by lack of foresight and diffidence in the name of caution.
A comprehensive study done by the Eastern Command two years back had brought out that China was ready to initiate its conspiracy against India. The report clearly enunciates the Chinese ‘External Calm and Internal Intensity’ strategy that will not be aimed at achieving any military gains but to to humiliate India, undermine its rise and dent its position.
The present local position held by the Chinese troops is 30 km south of Daulet Beg Oldi. Daulat Beg Oldi and its airstrip are located just south of the great Karakoram pass; it offers India a means to snap the road route between China and Pakistan and guard the eastern gates to the Siachen glacier. Thus it can, if China holds on, be interdicted.
Zorawar Daulet Singh, an expert on China-India military relationship, says, “The Ladakh incident has been provoked by the Chinese to bring about a new operating environment on the border and draw Delhi’s attention to the tactical level.” It sounds plausible when one analyses China's demands.
On one side, China is setting conditions to stop construction activities at Daulat Beg Oldi and at Chumar where a helipad is being built, and for some tin sheds at Fukche to be dismantled. What has miffed China is the Indian steps to better its infrastructure. Infrastructure development has been in the media for decades. It’s not that we are doing it secretly. Now, once China has completed its infrastructure build up it aims to hinder Indian side of infrastructure buildup.
Border patrols have increased from both sides as China increased its number every year. This is an extension of what was being tested for years. It can be termed as a mini Kargil. Although it was not an off-season intrusion, it was well planned and caliberated. There are clear signs that the Chinese are gradually adding up to the symbolic escalation as they started with tents, increased their numbers, added flags and they will keep waiting for Indian reactions and then will accordingly keep adding to the provocation. No country will throw its soldiers in and this is least possible from a country like China which plans its moves with great care.
If we draw a parallel with the war zone campaign, then this move by China is quite clearly akin to ‘External Calm and Internal Intensity’. The primary aim here is to lull the adversary into lethargy and inactivity, exactly like it happened before 1962. The slogan ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ sums it up the best. As in 1992, the army had drawn a precise analysis of 10 years of the Chinese plan ahead. In Indian army relocation plan and dual tasking official document of Indian Government had led to ending the posture taken during Operation Chequerboard. This operation was launched during General K Sundarji’s time when China had tried to grab a post in Sumdorong Chu. Gen Sundarji had deployed troops in an offensive posture and which had resulted in China backing off. But after the Army’s relocation plan this posture was discontinued. It might have been a wise decision then as it was based on operational information that China was not ready to fight a war for the next 10 years as it was to focus on building its economy and infrastructure. But the analysis that no fight would take place till 2002 also meant that China would be ready for action after 2002. What was our response apart from changing the posture? Did we engage in improving infrastructure and operational capacity? India has not bought artillery guns for two decades, Our air defence has holes, helicopters are lacking, tanks are night blind. Our field formations do not have proper practice ammunitions. The list is long even if we do not talk of the approved strategic roads after the Kargil Committee Report. We have awakened late and started proper allocation in 2010 which will take another 10 years to develop. So, since 1992 poor appreciation and bad military management have hobbled India. TSI, through its sources, has learnt that almost 30 to 40 per cent of the army’s vehicles do not have fuel to run them. In August 2012, an executive order was issued that no new vehicle would be bought.
Ironically the defence Budget increases every year but does not take cost escalation and inflation into account. A senior officer informed TSI that for nine years the utilization of Capital expenditure has been the maximum 9 percent of the allocation. “The first half of the year is wasted in delaying the files and then executive orders are issued and the allocations are blocked,” he adds.
From August the weather will make any troop movement impossible. China had tried the same strategy with Japan but met with strong resistance. It also used pressure tactics with Vietnam and the Philippines and is now doing the same with India. India not only needs to discuss issues with China in clear terms but also focus its priorities and build its national power in a synergized manner. Otherwise, it will only have to capitulate to the smart moves of the adversary.
Dr Dibyesh Anand, associate professor, Westminster University and an expert on China, believes there is relative paucity of neutral and non-nationalist scholarship from the mainstream Indian media, which prevents a dispassionate analysis and gives space to hawks who fit this event into the older lens of bad China/good India/impotent Indian government. He says: “The way out is to temper down the tension, and ensure serious conversation between Beijing and Delhi without the media baying for each other’s blood,” says Dr. Anand.
China has sent a complement of 50 troops 19 km into Indian territory in the DBO sector in the middle of the strategically-significant Depsang Bulge. The sector is at an altitude of 17,000 feet. Protracted discussions have just begun. China claims the territory as its own; India is busy finding ways to secure a retreat of Chinese troops. The development reflects poorly on Indi's so-called China experts.
China has been frantically developing its national power with economic acitivity, expansive military infrastructure and technology build-up. On the contrary, India has been a meek reactionary hobbled by lack of foresight and diffidence in the name of caution.
A comprehensive study done by the Eastern Command two years back had brought out that China was ready to initiate its conspiracy against India. The report clearly enunciates the Chinese ‘External Calm and Internal Intensity’ strategy that will not be aimed at achieving any military gains but to to humiliate India, undermine its rise and dent its position.
The present local position held by the Chinese troops is 30 km south of Daulet Beg Oldi. Daulat Beg Oldi and its airstrip are located just south of the great Karakoram pass; it offers India a means to snap the road route between China and Pakistan and guard the eastern gates to the Siachen glacier. Thus it can, if China holds on, be interdicted.
Zorawar Daulet Singh, an expert on China-India military relationship, says, “The Ladakh incident has been provoked by the Chinese to bring about a new operating environment on the border and draw Delhi’s attention to the tactical level.” It sounds plausible when one analyses China's demands.
On one side, China is setting conditions to stop construction activities at Daulat Beg Oldi and at Chumar where a helipad is being built, and for some tin sheds at Fukche to be dismantled. What has miffed China is the Indian steps to better its infrastructure. Infrastructure development has been in the media for decades. It’s not that we are doing it secretly. Now, once China has completed its infrastructure build up it aims to hinder Indian side of infrastructure buildup.
Border patrols have increased from both sides as China increased its number every year. This is an extension of what was being tested for years. It can be termed as a mini Kargil. Although it was not an off-season intrusion, it was well planned and caliberated. There are clear signs that the Chinese are gradually adding up to the symbolic escalation as they started with tents, increased their numbers, added flags and they will keep waiting for Indian reactions and then will accordingly keep adding to the provocation. No country will throw its soldiers in and this is least possible from a country like China which plans its moves with great care.
If we draw a parallel with the war zone campaign, then this move by China is quite clearly akin to ‘External Calm and Internal Intensity’. The primary aim here is to lull the adversary into lethargy and inactivity, exactly like it happened before 1962. The slogan ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ sums it up the best. As in 1992, the army had drawn a precise analysis of 10 years of the Chinese plan ahead. In Indian army relocation plan and dual tasking official document of Indian Government had led to ending the posture taken during Operation Chequerboard. This operation was launched during General K Sundarji’s time when China had tried to grab a post in Sumdorong Chu. Gen Sundarji had deployed troops in an offensive posture and which had resulted in China backing off. But after the Army’s relocation plan this posture was discontinued. It might have been a wise decision then as it was based on operational information that China was not ready to fight a war for the next 10 years as it was to focus on building its economy and infrastructure. But the analysis that no fight would take place till 2002 also meant that China would be ready for action after 2002. What was our response apart from changing the posture? Did we engage in improving infrastructure and operational capacity? India has not bought artillery guns for two decades, Our air defence has holes, helicopters are lacking, tanks are night blind. Our field formations do not have proper practice ammunitions. The list is long even if we do not talk of the approved strategic roads after the Kargil Committee Report. We have awakened late and started proper allocation in 2010 which will take another 10 years to develop. So, since 1992 poor appreciation and bad military management have hobbled India. TSI, through its sources, has learnt that almost 30 to 40 per cent of the army’s vehicles do not have fuel to run them. In August 2012, an executive order was issued that no new vehicle would be bought.
Ironically the defence Budget increases every year but does not take cost escalation and inflation into account. A senior officer informed TSI that for nine years the utilization of Capital expenditure has been the maximum 9 percent of the allocation. “The first half of the year is wasted in delaying the files and then executive orders are issued and the allocations are blocked,” he adds.
From August the weather will make any troop movement impossible. China had tried the same strategy with Japan but met with strong resistance. It also used pressure tactics with Vietnam and the Philippines and is now doing the same with India. India not only needs to discuss issues with China in clear terms but also focus its priorities and build its national power in a synergized manner. Otherwise, it will only have to capitulate to the smart moves of the adversary.
Dr Dibyesh Anand, associate professor, Westminster University and an expert on China, believes there is relative paucity of neutral and non-nationalist scholarship from the mainstream Indian media, which prevents a dispassionate analysis and gives space to hawks who fit this event into the older lens of bad China/good India/impotent Indian government. He says: “The way out is to temper down the tension, and ensure serious conversation between Beijing and Delhi without the media baying for each other’s blood,” says Dr. Anand.
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